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Postcoloniality is the condition of what we might ungenerously call 
a comprador intelligentsia: of a relatively small, Western-style, 
Western-trained, group of writers and thinkers who mediate the 
trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery. 
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH (149) 
As soon as any radically innovative thought becomes an -ism, its 
specific ground breaking force diminishes, its historical notoriety 
increases, and its disciples tend to become more simplistic, more 
dogmatic, and ultimately more conservative, at which time its power 
becomes institutional rather than analytical. 
BARBARA JOHNSON ( l l ) 
In the third world no one gets off on being third world. 
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK ("What Is It For?" 77) 
A 
x\ . s THE EPIGRAPHS above suggest, the "field" of (so-called) 
postcolonial studies is at that phase in its development in which, 
like every other revisionary discourse, it is melancholic about 
its new-found authority and incorporation into institutions of 
higher learning. This melancholic condition derives not only 
from postcolonial scholars' apprehension that institutionalizing 
the critique of imperialism may render it conciliatory but from 
other significant factors as well, such as their own (First World) 
place of speaking (which implicates them in the problematic 
of neo-colonialism), their criteria for political self-legitimation 
(that is, the impossibility of representing the Third World as anti-
imperialist constituency, especially in the face of the retreat of 
socialism), and their peculiar immobility as a positive opposi-
tional force for curricular change within the (American and 
British) academies. It is especially in the last sense that post-
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colonial studies differs from ethnic studies: for instance, it can-
not, unlike African or Asian-American studies, commit itself to 
canon revision, which is essentially a minoritarian project. Al-
though it is often associated with the impossible category of 
Third World literature, as a specific form of cultural studies it 
continually questions such totalizing concepts and thus main-
tains a critical if not hostile relationship to multiculturalism. The 
melancholia of postcolonialism also derives from the fact that 
today it faces its major criticisms and attacks against its very 
legitimacy and political viability from within its own ranks.1 The 
term itself has become suspect: a catch-all phrase for a post (read 
fashionable) Third Worldism.2 
While postcolonial studies has yet to inform positively all schol-
arly inquiry today, it is not far-fetched to suggest that it has 
certainly acquired, if not power, a certain institutional cachet, or, 
to use Arif Dirlik's term, an "aura" of innovativeness. Evidence of 
this new-found cachet or mystique is lodged, for instance, in a 
footnote in Naomi Schor's fascinating defense mounted on be-
half of French departments in the US. She writes: 
Commenting on the interest in postcolonialism, an eminent and 
respected colleague recently opined that Europe was dead. The 
statement seems astonishing in view of current (political) and future 
(economic) developments in that part of the world, which represents 
a population of 325 million and constitutes the second largest eco-
nomic block in the world. (33) 
What is interesting here is the assertion, by a scholar of such 
perspicuity as Schor, of the importance of Europe rather than 
the noting, for instance, of the imbrication of Europe and post-
colonial states or her colleague's peculiar disengagement of 
Europe from its others. In other words, she seems aware of the 
growing influence of a so-called postcolonial studies, but seems 
unclear about its scholarly focus, be it the critique of the continu-
ing power of Europe and North America over the Third World 
(as the work of Edward Said and Samir Amin would testify) or of 
its institutional place—that it is not a parallel discipline to Eng-
lish or French literary studies, but offers a critique of "national" 
literatures as such. It is inevitable that this sense of the post-
colonial mystique renders the field, for most area- or period-
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based scholars, incoherent if not totally "bankrupt," to use Emily 
Apter's term.3 While there is no doubt that the field has grown 
rapidly in the past few years, producing its own journals, confer-
ences, book-publishing series, and jobs (the recent spate of 
readers and anthologies bears testimony to the phenomenon4), 
the field itself remains undefinable and amorphous in its out-
lines. While it is possible to valorize rather than lament spe-
cific aspects of this amorphousness (an issue I will address 
later in this essay), much of the melancholia from within and 
the mystification from without emerge, I would argue, from an 
inadequately enunciated notion of the margin. The largely me-
chanical connection, even conflation, of postcolonialism with 
American multiculturalism, despite its perceived difference, 
even distance, from the latter, has meant that the relation be-
tween postcolonial studies and other minority studies has re-
mained under-theorized. What we compromise by neglecting to 
articulate the linkages between these two (largely academic) 
initiatives is not only a more textured or nuanced notion of the 
margin but the very possibility of a "postcolonial" critique. In 
the following, I consider briefly the ideological thrust of multi-
culturalism and postcolonialism through a reading of two works 
by Charles Taylor and Iain Chambers, respectively, not so much 
to rehearse their differences as to show how both discourses 
share a notion of the margin (as a spatial category) and thus once 
more overlook the possibilities of a "postcolonial" critique. 
According to Taylor in his "The Politics of Recognition," multi-
culturalism is based on the recognition of the dialogical nature 
of identity. The politics of recognition, as he defines it, is based 
not so much on the admission of historical injustice (as with 
affirmative action) but on contemporary coevality.5 According to 
Taylor, insofar as identity is constituted in our relations with 
others, being ignored or being negatively represented could 
have a detrimental effect on one's sense of self. Thus the right of 
the powerless or of people in the minority to agitate for proper 
recognition (through inclusion of their cultural contributions 
into the curriculum) is deemed consistent with our notions of 
authenticity and dignity. As Taylor puts it, 
The reason for these proposed changes is not, or not mainly, that 
all students may be missing something important through the ex-
50 KALPANA SESHADRI-CROOKS 
elusion of a certain gender or certain races or cultures, but ra-
ther that women and students from the excluded groups are given, 
either directly or by omission, a demeaning picture of themselves, as 
though all creativity and worth inhered in males of European prove-
nance. Enlarging and changing the curriculum is therefore essential 
not so much in the name of a broader culture for everyone as in order 
to give due recognition to the hitherto excluded. The background 
premise of these demands is that recognition forges identity. 
(65-66) 
The key terms in Taylor's analysis of multiculturalism are recog-
nition and respect or the equal right to dignity. Taylor locates 
the concept of multiculturalism squarely in Western liberalism, 
and much of his characterization of multiculturalism as the 
quest for recognition is undergirded by a subjectivist notion of 
authenticity: 
Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is 
something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am 
also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my 
own. This is the background understanding to the modern ideal of 
authenticity, and to the goals of self-fulfillment and self-realization in 
which the ideal is usually couched. (31) 
This sense of authenticity, Taylor (quoting Herder) suggests, can 
be extended to "the people" as well, an idea that then inaugu-
rates the modern form of nationalism. Decolonization, accord-
ing to Taylor, is "to give the peoples of what we now call the Third 
World their chance to be themselves unimpeded" (31 ) ; in other 
words, it is a way of returning them to their authentic selves. It is 
obvious from this emphasis on authenticity that Taylor will privi-
lege traditional and integrated societies, but the key issue in his 
argument apropos multiculturalism is judgement. No society, he 
argues, can be judged (as worthy or worthless) before it has been 
studied with respect. Taylor deplores as hypocritical at worst and 
condescending at best the form of multiculturalism that de-
mands not just respect and recognition but equal worth before 
study. As a presumption, he will allow 
that it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the 
horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse 
characters and temperaments, over a long period of time—that 
have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the 
admirable—are almost certain to have something that deserves our 
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admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we 
have to abhor and reject. (72-73) 
Yet real judgments of worth, he suggests, must be reserved until 
after study, a study that will transform our standards of judgment, 
that will achieve "a fusion of horizons," in Gadamer 's sense of the 
phrase, which will then enable us to form judgments of worth on 
a comparative basis. Judgments of value and worth "cannot be 
dictated by a principle of ethics," writes Taylor, they "are ulti-
mately a question of the human will" (69). The fact that a 
transformation of one's standards of judgment in studying a 
given culture may make comparative study impossible does not 
seem to trouble Taylor too much, invested as he is in the core 
authentic self that apparently can alter its perceptions of a cul-
ture without changing its fundamental vision of global cultural 
differences. To sum up, in Taylor's notion of multiculturalism, 
hierarchy between groups can be redressed through recognition 
and respect for the other's authenticity. Marginalized people 
must be dealt with fairly (63), and all cultures must be given 
the right to survive in their authenticity. Such a formulation 
necessarily assumes the following: integrated cultures, tradi-
tional long-surviving cultures, stable national, ethnic, and 
cultural identities, the possibility of studying and completely 
comprehending the other, comparative studies, and, finally, "au-
thentic" judgments of others based not on ethics but on human 
will. Taylor's multiculturalism is thus an epistemology of the 
other that can only make sense within the Christian liberal 
tradition that he invokes as its proper context. For our purposes, 
his analysis is useful as a reminder of two aspects of multicultural-
ism as practised in the US: a) it is essentially supplicatory; for all 
its talk of revisionism, it asks to partake in the privileges of the 
centre; and b) it is essentially a reinforcement of Western liberal-
ism. On a more mundane level, we see these claims bome out in 
Peter Brooks's letter to the editor of the New York Times on 
19 December 1994. Addressing Yale's latest albatross, the 
$20-million gift from Lee Bass (which has since been returned) 
to establish a Western civilization program, Brooks says most 
trenchantly: "Western civilization versus multiculturalism is 
a false opposition." As Roger Rouse argues in his recent analy-
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sis of the bourgeois management of the crisis of the nation state 
in the age of transnationalism, "the greatest significance of 
conservative monoculturalism," which argues for "a single cul-
ture and identity" for the US (381), and of "corporate liberal-
multiculturalism," which appropriates the radicalism of left/lib-
eral arguments, lies in their 
relationship of complementary opposition. Always offering at least 
the illusion of significant choice, they have seemed to fully exhaust 
the field of imaginable alternatives and, in doing so, they have 
endowed their commonalities [their emphases on bourgeois class 
positions, nationalism, and educational and political reform] with a 
powerfully constraining force. (385) 
We would do well to remember this point in our discussions of 
the alliance between postcolonialism and multiculturalism: far 
from undermining the hegemony of Western civilization, multi-
culturalism merely expands its frontiers both geographically— 
world culture itself is appended to the US—and pedagogically 
— a s the universal system of knowledge both in terms of method 
and ideology. 
The discipline of a so-called postcolonial studies, however, is a 
much more ambiguous one pedagogically, given that it is not 
really a minority studies. Rather than enhancing the girth of 
Western liberalism, postcolonial studies, if it is possible to speak 
of it as a unity or to generalize its political impulse, would work to 
examine the conditions by which a group arrogates to itself the 
function of granting or denying recognition and respect. Fur-
thermore, it would seriously call into question Taylor's advocacy 
of studying the other for comparative purposes as another form 
of imperialism or orientalism: one that reinscribes the Western 
cultural relativist as universal subject with the other serving as 
informant.6 However, I would argue that it is the critique of 
positive knowing, of rationalism, even of humanism and values of 
radical transformation when undertaken under the sign of post-
coloniality, which awkwardly positions postcolonialism as neither 
liberalism nor (an orthodox) Marxism, that has generated the 
crisis within this subdiscipline. In other words, it is at this point of 
differentiation from liberal multiculturalism (which character-
izes itself as marginality studies) that postcolonial discourse be-
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comes politically vulnerable. Before I take up this theme with 
reference to Aijaz Ahmad's influential Marxist denunciation of 
the field on the grounds of its postmodern biases, however, it is 
imperative to see how the agenda of postmodern criticism again 
embarrasses "postcoloniality" by once more characterizing it as 
the discourse of the margin (as the space of otherness), by 
placing it at the vanguard of cultural and political critique. 
Affirmative action and multiculturalism, in their liberal 
modes, conceptualize the margin spatially, as the excluded and 
unintegrated other. In some ways, these initiatives posit a Utopian 
moment in which the marginal as such will cease to exist, with 
power circulating freely and fluidly connecting and equalizing 
all points of habitation. In this conception, the margin is the 
space of agitation, subversion, and thus of theoretical innova-
tion. Yet, if, with George Yudice, we re-examine the notion of 
marginality as an "essentially" innovative space, we realize the 
futility of such a claim, which can only be made through an 
evasion of material history: 
There was a time when to be "marginal" meant to be excluded, 
forgotten, overlooked. Gradually, throughout this century, first in 
the discourses of anthropology, sociology, and psychoanalysis, "mar-
ginality" became a focus of interest through which "we" (Western 
culture) discovered otherness and our own ethnocentric perspec-
tives. Today, it is declared, the "marginal" is no longer peripheral but 
central to all thought. (214) 
What is worth noting here is the way in which the spatial margin, 
that is, margin as subject position, becomes also the source of 
rejuvenation of the centre, where knowledge as positive knowing 
is made possible. The academic industry of postcolonial studies 
has gained the status of a phenomenon within this paradigm of 
positivity. Thus, despite its contrary political impulses (as I will 
show in my reading of Iain Chambers), it is aligned uncritically 
(by liberalism and postmodernism) in an analogical relationship 
with multiculturalism and thus faces the consequence of melan-
cholia or debilitation. To elaborate: what this subdiscipline is 
perceived to offer today that, ostensibly, no other minority or 
ethnic studies does, is not so much a revolutionary method, 
inventive theories, or even new fields of inquiry, but quite liter-
ally (and perhaps crudely) an exotic new frontier, a hitherto 
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unaccounted-for margin that must be tamed or theorized: it is 
here we tell ourselves that a theory will be made that will express 
in dazzling synchronicity and relationality the disparate and 
incorrigible issues of race, ethnicity, gender, nation, class, and 
eurocentrism, as well as the conditions of marginality. migration, 
and minoritization. For many scholars situated "outside" of the 
field, postcolonial cultural studies seems to or is exhorted to 
offer the possibility of a radically revised history: a relentlessly 
dissident method of reading that will alter the way business is 
done in and out of academia. An excellent and particularly 
compelling example of this kind of exhortation is Iain Cham-
bers's Migrancy, Culture, Identity. 
In the chapter entitled 'The Broken World," Chambers argues 
that the presence of increasingly vocal postcolonials in the me-
tropolis not only challenges the univocality of European thought 
construed as rational, logical, universal, and objective but fur-
ther confounds the comfortable binarisms of self and other, 
margin and periphery, English and native. The significant conse-
quence of this disruption of categories, according to Chambers, 
however, is the exposure of the notion of authenticity: its fascist 
potential when deployed as Europeanness or Englishness, and its 
derivativeness when deployed simplistically as Négritude (pace 
Senghor) or nativism. For Chambers, unlike Taylor, authenticity 
is not a subjective category but a structural one that positions 
actors outside modernity. "To relinquish such a perspective" of 
authenticity or of returning to the roots, writes Chambers, "leads 
us to recognise a post-colonial and post-European context in 
which historical and cultural differences, while moving to dif-
ferent rhythms, are coeval, are bound to a common time. 'Com-
munication is, ultimately, about creating shared Time'" (74, 
quoting Johannes Fabian). In other words, in so far as (that 
suspect category of) authenticity, either of the self or the ob-
jectifiable other, is enabled by the imperialist logic of moder-
nity that positions others as occupying another temporality, the 
recognition of coevality in the postcolonial world means that 
claiming authenticity is no longer "feasible." "Post-colonialism 
is perhaps the sign of an increasing awareness that it is not 
feasible to subtract a culture, a history, a language, an identity, 
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from the wider, transforming currents of the increasingly metro-
politan world. It is impossible to 'go home' again" (74). For 
Chambers, the poetics of postmodernism best expresses this con-
dition of homelessness and inevitable hybridity. Naming the 
cultural fusions in world music and other art forms as the "metro-
politan vernacular," he interestingly circumvents the Marxist 
problematic of postmodern aesthetics as a symptom of late cap-
italism by resorting to the notion of local market demands versus 
the totalizing agency of capitalism (76-77).7 Further, he asks 
whether phenomena such as world music are not engaging in 
a movement of historical decentering in which the very axis of center 
and periphery, together with its economic, political and cultural 
traffic, has, as a minimum, begun to be interrogated from elsewhere, 
from other places and positions? For is it not possible to glimpse in 
recent musical contaminations, hybrid languages and cultural mix-
tures an opening on to other worlds, experiences, histories, in which 
not only does the "Empire write back to the center," as Salman 
Rushdie puts it, but also "sounds off" against it? . . . The master's 
language is transformed into creole . . . and all varieties of local 
cultural refashioning, as it moves to a different tempo in a "reversal of 
colonial history." (84-85) 
What is most commendable about Chambers's analysis is his 
insistence that the margin/centre dichotomy be thoroughly dis-
persed. From within this productive confusion, he suggests, may 
arise two consequences: the exposure of the state apparatus in all 
its repressive and ideological operations and a recognition of the 
implication of the citizenry in all forms of repression: 
Previous margins—ethnic, gendered, sexual—now reappear at the 
center. No longer restricted to the category of a "special issue" (e.g. 
"race relations"), or "problem" (e.g. "ethnic minorities," "sexual 
deviancy"), such differences become central to our very sense of 
time, place and identity. (86) 
Despite (or perhaps because of) his Utopian futurism, however, 
there are several logical problems in Chambers's argument. First 
of all is his inadvertent totalization of the postcolonial subject. In 
his single-minded determination to blow up the centre, the 
postcolonial construed as the logical agent of sedition is made to 
carry the bomb. Less metaphorically, it is Chambers's assumption 
that all migrant subjects inevitably constitute a subculture that is 
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untenable. It is this unstated assumption that enables him to 
construct pantheons of black artists (68-69) and postcolonial 
discourse theorists (70)8 as being collectively (even consen-
sually) engaged in the critique of the Occident in a manner that 
elides serious differences between these writers and ignores 
these writers as occupying (academically and performatively) an 
internally conflictual space. As Stuart Hall puts it with reference 
to black British cinema: 
Films are not necessarily good because black people make them. 
They are not necessarily "right-on" by virtue of the fact that they deal 
with the black experience. Once you enter the politics of the end of 
the black subject you are plunged headlong into the maelstrom of a 
continuously contingent, unguaranteed, political argument and de-
bate: a critical politics, a politics of criticism. You can no longer 
conduct black politics through the strategy of a simple set of rever-
sals, putting in the place of the bad old essential white subject, the 
new essentially good black subject. Now, that formulation may seem 
to threaten the collapse of an entire political world. (28) 
In other words, Chambers's vision of resistance does not enter 
into that phase of political engagement that Hall rightly has 
characterized as the shift from a "relations of representation," 
which involves counter-racist narratives and a struggle over the 
access to representation, to a "politics of representation," which 
not only involves theorizing the differences of race, ethnicity, 
and culture but a "struggle around positionalities" itself (28): 
There is another position, one which locates itself inside a continuous 
struggle and politics around black representation, but which then is 
able to open up a continuous critical discourse about themes, about 
the forms of representation, the subjects of representations, above 
all, the regimes of representation. Once you abandon essential cate-
gories, there is no place to go apart from the politics of criticism and 
to enter the politics of criticism in black culture is to grow up, to leave 
the age of critical innocence. (30) 
Secondly, in his critique of authenticity secured by the argument 
about temporal non-coevality, Chambers elides Fabian's recom-
mendation to "create" coevality for proper communication with 
a "recognition" of coevality given the condition of postcolonial-
ism. Thus coevality, or the lack of it, becomes merely false con-
sciousness; what is important, Chambers seems to suggest, is that 
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we recognize that we are "really," that is to say, "authentically," 
coeval. The problem with this logic is two-fold. First, the situating 
of authenticity as a spatial category, and that of hybridity as a 
temporal one, effectively locates authenticity (in so far as space is 
conceived non-historically) on another temporal register out-
side the transforming currents of time. Second, authenticity is 
somehow made to depend on disjunct temporalities and vice 
versa, and thus the absolute pronouncement—one can never go 
home again. Thus the postcolonial is not only always-already 
hybrid, but she is so always with reference to the West. What 
Chambers is unable to visualize in his delineation of postcolonial 
ontology, which is really an idealization of the migrant as post-
colonial paradigm, are forms of cultural practice—musical or 
otherwise—that adapt to and march in step with Western hege-
mony but define themselves as "authentic" in so far as they 
continue indifferent to the West for purposes of validation, per-
petuation, and aesthetic evaluation. This form of authenticity, 
however, must be distinguished from Taylor's more subjectivist 
and essentialist notion. In other words, authenticity can be better 
understood in performative rather than ontological terms. The 
vigorous state of traditional music in the North and South of 
India is an example of this form of "authenticity," and its practi-
tioners not only presuppose the possibility of going home but 
would probably argue (despite their itinerant life-styles) that 
they have never left home in the first place.9 In other words, I am 
suggesting that Chambers's implication of authenticity in non-
coevality is a non sequitur and has the curious effect of re-casting 
the erstwhile "dead native" as hybrid. The overall effect, as I 
implied earlier, is the construction of the postcolonial as an 
authentically dissident or marginal subject. It is in response 
to this interpellation that postcolonial studies falls into melan-
cholia and sometimes political disarray. 
While it may appear that Taylor's liberal multiculturalism and 
Chambers's dissonant politics of "no respect" are aversive, what is 
interesting in both their analyses is the way in which the terms 
"authenticity," "hierarchy," and "margin" carry enormous bur-
dens of significance. Briefly: while authenticity is, for Taylor, an 
individualist category that directly impinges on one's self-esteem 
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and sense of well-being, for Chambers, authenticity is a structural 
notion, a subject position—an impossibility in the modern world 
because it implies hierarchy: "Subordinate subjects have invaria-
bly been ordained to the stereotyped immobilism of an essential 
'authenticity,' in which they are expected to play out roles, desig-
nated for them by others... for ever" (38). Hierarchy, for Taylor, 
means non-reciprocal "other dependence" (44-51); for Cham-
bers, it means temporal non-coevality. For Taylor, hierarchy can 
be undone with respect and recognition (temporality and mod-
ernity being non-factors in his analysis) ; for Chambers, on the 
other hand, hierarchy can be undone only through hybridity and 
confusion of categories. Modernity, as Chambers construes it, is 
univocal and imperialist and cannot accommodate authentic 
differences.10 Both Taylor and Chambers agree, then, that equal-
ity and difference are contradictory and inevitably based on a 
notion of sameness. Yet Taylor is willing to let the contradiction 
lie, while Chambers wants to create equality in order that differ-
ence becomes a basis for identity rather than alienation. For 
Taylor, the margin is "them," the others who must be dealt with 
and managed: 'The challenge is to deal with their sense of 
marginalization without compromising our basic political princi-
ples" (63). The West, he implies, is guilty and can redress the 
problem. For Chambers, the margin is the site of subversion—it 
must be made to arrive at the centre and disrupt it. For both 
Taylor and Chambers, however, as I mentioned earlier, the mar-
gin is a source of rejuvenation. A future moment must be posited 
when it will be either incorporated or dissolved and hierarchy 
will be undone. 
Gayatri Spivak has addressed the profound contradictions 
of this liberal/postmodern demand, most notably in her essay 
"Who Claims Alterity?" Regarding the position of marginality 
(construed as a potentially subversive space) sometimes claimed 
by but often imposed upon postcolonial subjects, Spivak writes of 
this ideological entrapment: 
the stories of the postcolonial world are not necessarily the same as 
the stories coming from "internal colonization," the way the metro-
politan countries discriminate against disenfranchised groups in 
their midst. The diasporic postcolonial can take advantage (most 
often unknowingly, I hasten to add) of the tendency to conflate the 
AT THE MARGINS OF POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 59 
two in the metropolis. Thus this frequently innocent informant, 
identified and welcomed as the agent of an alternative history, may 
indeed be the site of a chiasmas, the crossing of a double contradic-
tion: the system of production of the national bourgeoisie at home, 
and abroad, the tendency to represent neocolonialism by the semio-
tic of "internal colonization." (274-75) 
The consequence of this poorly analyzed double contradiction is 
that by homogenizing and masking the contingent otherness of 
postcoloniality into an undifferentiated margin, the political 
efficaciousness of a "postcolonial" critique is weakened consid-
erably. However, it is actually in its points of differentiation 
from such homogenizing notions of the margin, more precisely 
in its critique of positive knowledge alluded to earlier, that post-
colonial studies faces its greatest challenges. It is not simply that 
being marginal is no longer a possibility. Rather, it is that some of 
the impasses in our field result from the ways in which the margin 
as sign and standard (as a measure of value and as political 
cause) gets deployed. 
We can conceive of margin/marginality in two ways: a) as 
subject position — the excluded other that must be coaxed into 
the centre through incorporation, inversion, hybridization, revo-
lution; or b) margin as irreducible other—the condition for the 
production of our discourse (and all positive knowledge) that 
must be acknowledged as incommensurable and irrecuperable. 
The former speaks the positive discourse of rights, while the 
latter speaks the negative discourse of limits." With reference to 
the latter, in The Order of Things, Michel Foucault characterizes 
the modern episteme as marked by the emergence of Man in his 
finite spatiality as the subject and object of his own knowledge: 
At the foundation of all the empirical positivities, and of everything 
that can indicate itself as a concrete limitation of man's existence, we 
discover a finitude—which is in a sense the same: it is marked by the 
spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, and the time of lan-
guage; and yet it is radically other: in this sense, the limitation is 
expressed not as a determination imposed upon man from outside 
(because he has a nature or a history), but as a fundamental finitude 
which rests on nothing but its own existence as fact, and opens upon 
the positivity of all concrete limitation. (315) 
In other words, it is no longer a question of knowing the limits of 
knowledge, as with classical philosophy, but of discerning the 
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constitutive negativity, the otherness, the irrecuperable, the "un-
thought" that makes positive knowing possible.12 It is this latter 
notion of the margin, of course, that has enabled the most 
powerful critiques of anthropology, orientalism, and compara-
tive philology.13 Said's Orientalism, which was the first significant 
attempt to disclose the constitutive function of this margin for 
western knowledge, attests to the fact that such critiques are 
often implicit in the deconstruction of the "metaphysics of pres-
ence"; more explicitly, they may be channelled through Fou-
cault's notions of the limit and of power/knowledge. That so 
many analyses of colonialism, following in the wake of Said's 
work, have reiterated the shadow of this margin, is the precise 
bone of contention between postcolonialists and so-called ortho-
dox Marxists, represented most vocally by Aijaz Ahmad. But let us 
attend in greater detail, if briefly, to Ahmad's problems with a so-
called postcolonial discourse. 
In his essay 'The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality," Ahmad 
characterizes postcolonial literature and cultural criticism as 
offsprings of a postmodernism that they disseminate zealously 
(io).14 Ahmad does not explain what he specifically means by 
the term "postmodernism" (other than by positing the untenable 
proposition that it is an anti-Marxism), nor does he explain why 
the term should be self-evidently disparaging. Rather, he illus-
trates his thesis that postcolonialism is the progeny of post-
modernism by fastening on short passages from Gayatri Spivak 
and Homi Bhabha and then performing close readings of them 
after the manner of deconstructive literary critics. While there 
is much in Ahmad's essay that merits close attention, I shall 
focus on his interpretation of Spivak and those themes that 
he designates as characteristic of postcolonial postmodernity— 
hybridity and contingency (ambivalence is mentioned but not 
analyzed)—to show that despite his call for a return to a funda-
mental Marxism, his own critique is caught up in the contradic-
tions that attend totalizations of any kind, be it Marxism or 
postcolonialism. 
For instance, in his reading of Spivak's often-quoted passage 
in which she asserts that the concept metaphors of "nation-
hood, constitutionality, citizenship, democracy, socialism" are 
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"effectively reclaimed" in postcoloniality as "regulative political 
concepts" for which "no historically adequate referent may be 
advanced from postcolonial space" ("Scattered Speculations" 
281), Ahmad mounts his polemic on what turns out to be a 
contradictory ground. In his quotation, he elides the following: 
Spivak says, "Within the historical frame of exploration, coloniza-
tion, and decolonization, what is being effectively reclaimed is a 
series of regulative political concepts, the supposedly authorita-
tive narrative of whose production was written elsewhere, in the 
social formations of Western Europe" ( 281 ). By choosing to elide 
the question of ideological regulation, which invokes Althusser's 
notion of ideology (in general) as having no history (Althusser 
159-61), Ahmad can read the phrase "no historically adequate 
referent" literally as about "political history" (4). There is social-
ism and nationalism in India, he reminds us; we only have to 
remember the masses who vote for the communist ticket and the 
fact that it was the nationalist struggle and not colonialism that 
invested India with nationhood. The literalism here is a conse-
quence of what Ahmad marginalizes: Spivak's insistence that 
socialism, nationalism, etc., in so far as they function as regula-
tive political concepts, effectively resituates struggle within the 
frame of imperialism. This is not a denial of history but a com-
ment on the limits of historiography itself. Yet the literalism 
permits Ahmad to read ideological critique here as free-floating 
dehistoricizing postmodernism, thus re-enacting, in the name of 
Marx, what Spivak problematizes: ideological regulation. Yet 
Ahmad is not consistently an orthodox Marxist, for in his consid-
eration that perhaps Spivak is speaking of these concepts in 
terms of "the European origin of these words," he expresses his 
consternation thus: 
Even with regard to concepts, I did not know that mere origins 
—("myth of origins?")—mattered all that much in postmodern 
discourse, nor does it seem appropriate that everything that ori-
ginates in Europe should be consigned so unilaterally to the "heri-
tage of imperialism," unless we subscribe to an essentialist notion 
of an undifferentiated Europe where everything and everyone is 
imperialist. (5) 
Here the problem with Spivak is that she is not being construc-
tionist enough for Ahmad, and is slipping into a pre-modern 
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"dangerous" notion of origins and essences. From what was first 
a charge of too much postmodernism, Ahmad now castigates 
Spivak for not being postmodern enough for his purposes. 
Nevertheless, postmodernism continues to function as a pecu-
liar catch-all phrase of derision for Ahmad, usefully encapsulat-
ing poststructuralism, deconstruction, and, of course, colonial 
discourses. The most egregious example of this totalizing im-
pulse is evident in his critique of Bhabha's notion of hybridity. 
What is peculiar in Ahmad's reading of Bhabha is that he attrib-
utes a "celebratory" tone to the latter, believing that the notion 
"partakes of a carnivalesque collapse and play of identities, and 
comes under a great many names" ( 13). While it may be beside 
the point to engage in an argument on the "correct" interpreta-
tion of hybridity, which I understand to mean not an arbitrary 
mixture of cultures and a surplus of pleasure but the uncanny 
and undermining effect produced by the incompatibility of dis-
courses in unequal power relations,15 it must be acknowledged 
that the notion of carnivalesque subversion is more evocative of 
Bakhtin than of Bhabha. Ahmad's real quarrel with Bhabha's 
notion of hybridity, however, is that: a) it dispenses with "a sense 
of place, of belonging, of some stable commitment to one's class 
or gender or nation [which] may be useful for defining one's 
politics"; and b) that it is "posited as the negation of the 'organic 
intellectual' as Gramsci conceived of it" (14). The point about 
stable identities is a familiar one; we have already encountered it 
in relation to Charles Taylor. The fact that such stability may not 
be easily available in this age of total capitalist penetration, and 
that, in fact, such (commodified) commitment to "one's class," at 
this historical moment, may produce fascisms of the sort Ahmad 
himself laments in India and elsewhere (where religious and 
ethnic solidarities exceed those of class), is not considered at all. 
This is because Ahmad is not so much interested in the question 
of the nature or grounds of political commitment but rather in 
the deployment of Marx and Gramsci as prophylactics of post-
modernism. Thus Bhabha's bracketing of the organic intellec-
tual is again read as travesty rather than on its own terms. While I 
do not want to open a discussion of Gramsci's concepts or 
Bhabha's reading of them at this point, it would be salutary to 
AT THE MARGINS OF POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 63 
recall Gramsci's declared view of intellectual orthodoxy in his 
'The Study of Philosophy," with its particular attention to limits 
as such: 
Who is to fix the "rights of knowledge" and the limits of the pursuit of 
knowledge? And can these rights and limits indeed be fixed? It seems 
necessary to leave the task of researching after new truths and better, 
more coherent, clearer formulations of the truths themselves to the 
free initiative of individual specialists, even though they may contin-
ually question the very principles that seem most essential. (341) 
"Organic intellectual" is not a term that transparently signifies 
social good. Like everything else, the possibilities of such leader-
ship need to be "elaborated," in the Gramscian sense of the term, 
in its contingent and specific historicity. 
This leads us to the next point that Ahmad invokes as char-
acteristic of postcolonial postmodernity—the theme of con-
tingency as mediated once again through Bhabha's quotation 
of Veena Das (Ahmad, "Politics" 14-15). For Ahmad, the 
emphasis on the contingent nature of a given (caste or class) 
conflict is an act of de-historicization and political passivity. It is 
de-historicizing because it recommends that, 
when it comes to caste conflicts, each historical moment must be 
treated as sui generis and as carrying within itself its own explanation 
[and that] the understanding of each conflict [must] be confined to 
the characteristics of that conflict.... What is denied ... is that caste 
is a structural and not merely contingent feature in the distribution 
of powers and privileges. . . . [W] hen the theorist . . . denies the 
structural endurance of histories and calls upon us to think only of 
the contingent moment . . . we are in effect being called upon to 
overlook the position of class and caste privileges from which such 
theories emanate and such invocations issue. ( 15) 
The consequence of such anti-structuralist analysis for Ahmad is 
political passivity: 
Such premises preclude ... the very bases of political action. For the 
idea of collective human agent (e.g., organized groups of the ex-
ploited castes fighting for their rights against upper-caste privilege) 
presumes both what Habermas calls communicative rationality as 
well as the possibility of rational action as such; it presumes, in other 
words, that agencies are constituted not in flux and displacement but 
in given historical locations. (15-16) 
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There are at least two unexamined contradictions in Ahmad's 
argument: a) the opposition between the historicity of conflict 
and contingency, and b) the alliance between a structural read-
ing of history and rational action. Much of the problem has to do 
with Ahmad's untheorized notion of conflict and its relation to 
history in the first place. For Bhabha, as I understand it, the 
analysis of conflict as contingency is reliant on the notion of 
conflict as constitutive of history or historical change, rather 
than on a view of conflict as a factor in an idealist progression of 
an objective and real history. In Laclau's terms, in so far as 
"identities and their conditions of existence form an inseparable 
whole" (21), "the conditions of existence of any objectivity that 
might exist must be sought at the level of a factual history" (22). 
For instance, to such a question as "is the English revolution of 
the seventeenth century the bourgeois-democratic revolution?" 
Laclau responds: 
The "bourgeois-democratic revolution," far from being an object to 
be identified in different latitudes (France, England, Italy)—an 
object that would therefore establish relations of exteriority with its 
specific conditions of existence in different contexts—would instead 
be an object that is deformed and redefined by each of its contingent 
contexts. There would merely be "family resemblances" between the 
different "bourgeois-democratic revolutions." This allows the formu-
lation of questions such as: how bourgeois was the democratic revolu-
tion in the country X?; or rather, how democratic was the bourgeoisie 
in context Y? (22) 
Thus, for Laclau, and for "postcolonials" such as Bhabha and 
Veena Das, the analysis of conflict requires that "the very cate-
gories of social analysis . . . be historicized" (Laclau 22) 
in a movement that "radically contextualizes" rather than de-
historicizes conflict. 
Furthermore, when Ahmad goes on to read the consequences 
of radical historicization or contingency as precluding "commu-
nicative action" (in Habermas's sense of the term) because the 
former has no structural understanding of history, he generates a 
further confusion by collapsing structuralist theories of history 
with the more consciousness-based theories of Habermas or even 
Lukács. The relationship between Habermas's notion of commu-
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nicative action (which is based on Enlightenment notions of 
progress) and the more structural notions of history (which one 
associates with Althusser and Balibar) does not seem self-evident 
or in any way a logical connection. Again, the problem here is 
Ahmad's refusal to engage with the fundamental question of 
identity as such; thus his analysis falls into a kind of idealism that 
Gramsci would characterize as "common sense." My point is that 
Ahmad's denunciation of postcolonialism as an anti-Marxism 
(due to its association with postmodernism) seems highly du-
bious given that Marxism is not some sort of ready-made grid that 
can be imposed upon social realities; rather, Marxism is itself a 
highly conflictual discourse whose terms and concepts must be 
constandy negotiated if they are to be made useful. The fact 
remains that issues of ideology, structure, and conflict or histori-
cal change, insofar as they must be negotiated and re-defined in 
their contingency, do radically call into question our totalization 
of knowledge. To dismiss such inquiry as ludic postmodernism 
because of its compatibility with Derrida's critiques of philosophy 
or with Foucault's rewriting of historiography seems hasty at best 
and authoritarian at worst. The problem with Ahmad's criticisms 
of postcolonial discourse is that he refuses to acknowledge, at the 
"fundamental" level of political orientation, i.e. the investment 
in class and race politics, the continuity between his own position 
and that which he repudiates as the brood of postmodernism. 
But to return to the question of postcolonial studies as mar-
ginality studies: one consequence of deploying an undifferenti-
ated notion of the margin is that postcolonial studies has been 
stereotyped as an acceptable form of academic radicalism.16 This 
has meant that scholars once intimately, even emblematically, 
associated with the "postcolonial" find themselves having to 
distance themselves from this "politically correct" term by de-
nouncing it from within. What it comes down to is an anxiety over 
the loss of the margin, which results in the redrawing of lines and 
a struggle over the margin itself. As R. Radhakrishnan puts it in 
"Postcoloniality and the Boundaries of Identity," 
the critic intellectual is divorced from the politics of solidarity and 
constituency. The critic is forever looking for that radical "elsewhere" 
that will validate "perennial readings against the grain," and the 
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intellectual is busy planning multiple transgressions to avoid being 
located ideologically and/or macropolitically. (761) 
The notion of the margin as the site of struggle for the outermost 
limit, then, takes on a new meaning as it is fetishized and reified 
as the "dislocated" and authoritative critical position, which then 
reveals the "real" stake in these battles: the margin as turf.17 
My task here is not to ride out in the defense of postcolonial 
studies, even if such an object existed for the purpose. Rather, 
what I am interested in are the consequences that attend the 
deployment of an undifferentiated notion of the margin. I sug-
gest that the exploration of postcoloniality from the point of view 
of the margin (as the excluded and the limit) can be thought of 
as the realm of postcolonial scholarship. While we cannot cease 
to uncover the politics of marginalization that provides the impe-
tus to criticism, we also need to conceive of the "politics of 
criticism" as elaborated by Stuart Hall as an ironic project. By this 
I mean that "postcolonialism" must rehearse continually the 
conditions for the production of its own discourse or be doomed 
to fall into a form of anthropology.18 As Barbara Johnson suggests 
in the context of deconstruction, "any discourse that is based on 
the questioning of boundary lines must never stop questioning 
its own" (14). If postcolonial studies can be said to possess any 
pedagogical efficacy at all, then that energy arises from its inde-
terminate location and failure to recoup the margin. The confla-
tionary (counter) critiques mentioned above, then, cannot be 
located "outside" of the field and thereby be made to engender 
what Said, in his "Intellectuals in the Post-Colonial World," terms 
a "politics of blame" (45). It is undeniable that the debates 
generated by these critiques are not only salient to the project of 
postcolonial studies but are themselves indicative of the thankful 
lack of triumphalism of the f i e l d — o r so it seems, as long as they 
do not divert discussion from the issues about larger material 
determinants to a skirmish over or at the margin. To quote R. 
Radhakrishnan again: 
Postcoloniality at best is a problematic field where heated debates 
and contestations are bound to take place for quite a while to come. 
My point here is that whoever joins the polemical dialogue should do 
so with a critical-sensitive awareness of the legitimacies of several 
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other perspectives on the issue. In other words, it would be quite 
futile and divisive in the long run for any one perspective such as the 
diasporic, the indigenous, the orthodox Marxist, etc., to begin with 
the brazen assumption that it alone has the ethico-political right to 
speak representatively on behalf of "postcoloniality." Such an as-
sumption can only take the form of a pedagogical arrogance that is 
interested more in correcting other points of view rather than engag-
ing with them in a spirit of reciprocity. No one historical angle can 
have a monopolistic hold over the possible elaborations of the "post-
colony," especially during times when master discourses in general, 
e.g. modernity, nationalism, international Communism/Marxism, 
are deservedly in disarray. (762) 
Another reason for the lack of triumphalism of postcolonial 
studies pertains to its institutional and theoretical amorphous-
ness: it has no theory to speak of, concerned as it is with micro-
cultural and micro-political practices and issues. Unlike other 
area studies, postcolonial studies has no identifiable object: it 
would be impossible to suggest that it pertains to one or another 
area of the world or that it is confined to a period, genre, or 
theme; nor can it name a stable First or Third World subject as its 
legitimate speaker (as can, for instance, women's studies, Afro-
American, or gay and lesbian studies). From this perspective, it 
may be acceptable to claim that postcolonial studies is concerned 
more with the analysis of the lived condition of unequal power-
sharing globally and the self-authorization of cultural, economic, 
and militaristic hegemony, rather than with a particular histori-
cal phenomenon such as colonialism, which may be plotted as a 
stage of capitalist imperialism. It is interested, above all, in the 
materialist critique of power, and how that power or ideology 
seeks to interpellate subjects within a discourse as subordinate 
and without agency. In some ways, it is this amorphousness that 
permits it to be simultaneously self-critical and oppositional. As 
well, it is this free-form aspect of postcolonial studies that makes 
it the target of both the Right and the so-called Left. Yet perhaps 
it is this shapelessness, this refusal to stay still, to define itself, 
or defend itself, that makes postcolonial studies a particularly 
hospitable interstice from which to work out the paradoxes of 




As R. Radhakrishnan points out, u[t]he important thing to notice here is the 
overall cuUuralist mode of operation: in other words, we are not talking about 
postcolonial economies, histories, or politics. The obsessive focus is on post-
coloniality as a cultural conjuncture" (751). 
See Shohat for an elaboration of this theme. 
Apter writes: 
It seems that the theoretical and political categories of postcolonialism, even as 
they burgeon and become increasingly sophisticated, are also becoming more 
rapidly used up and, in many instances, altogether bankrupt. Preludes and 
prefaces that take great pains to situate the writer/viewer in a redemptive 
practice that is ultimately a reenactment of just what she or he is trying to avoid 
(the voyeurism of "other-gazing"), all these verbal markers and narrative 
devices repeat the colonial gesture of self-authorization. (299) 
In an essay written in 1991, Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge argue that Bill Ash-
croft's, Gareth Griffiths's, and Helen Tiffin's The Empire Writes Back (1989) was 
the first attempt to substitute for the erstwhile category of Commonwealth 
literature that of postcolonial writing. Although this book came out 11 years after 
Said's Orientalism, which most scholars consider as the inaugural text of the field, I 
agree with Mishra and Hodge that for all of its problems, The Empire Writes Back 
did perform an important pedagogical function: there was now a teachable text 
on the market that summarized the limits and possibilities of this new field of 
inquiry. Mishra's and Hodge's essay has been reprinted in Williams and Chris-
man. For other notable anthologies of postcolonial "theory," see Adam and H. 
Tiffin; Slemon and H. Tiffin; Whidock and H. Tiffin; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and H. 
Tiffin (The Postcolonial Studies Reader); C. Tiffin and Lawson; and White. 
For a characterization of affirmative action as a recognition of past historical 
injustice see Steele, Chapter 7. 
See also Mohanty, and Appiah. 
For an explanation of the "Marxist problematic," see Harvey, and Jameson. 
For instance: 
here, in the crisis of enunciation, we can also recognise a potential conver-
gence between radical feminist theory—Luce Irigaray, Carla Lonzi, Helene 
Cixous, Alice Jardine, Rosi Braidotti, Jane Flax, Susan Hekman, Judith But-
ler—with its sustained critique of the presumptions of occidental discourse: a 
convergence that is direcdy inscribed in the work of Gayatri Spivak, Trinh 
T. Minh-ha, bell hooks, Paul Gilroy and Homi Bhabha, for example, and which 
is destined for greater dialogue. (70) 
See Clifford's "Travelling Theories" for a discussion of this notion of authenticity. 
For an excellent reconsideration of the monological views of modernity, see 
Fuchs. 
I am indebted to Cornell's monumental book 7¾« Philosophy of the Limit for an 
understanding of this concept as a primarily ethical demarcation. See especially 
Chapter 3. 
For a neo-Marxist formulation of negativity as the foundation of radical politics and history, see Laclau. See Bemal; Cl fford and Marcus; and Said, "Represe ting the Colonized: Anthro-p logy's Interlocutors." 
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14 He writes: 
[T] he term "postcolonial" also comes to us as the name of a discourse about the 
condition of "postcoloniality," so that certain kinds of critics are "postcolonial" 
and others not Following on which is the attendant assertion that only those 
critics, who believe not only that colonialism has more or less ended but who 
also subscribe to the idea of the end of Marxism, nationalism, collective 
historical subjects and revolutionary possibility as such, are the true post-
colonials, while the rest of us, who do not quite accept this apocalyptic anti-
Marxism, are not postcolonial at all . . . so that only those intellectuals can be 
truly postcolonial who are also postmodern. (10) 
15 See Bhabha's essays "Signs Taken For Wonders" and "Articulating the Archaic" in 
his The Location of Culture. 
16 For an understanding of the concept of "stereotyping," see Bhabha, "The Other 
Question." 
17 It can be argued that the skirmish over the margin is not peculiar to postcolonial 
studies, and that feminism, in fact, seems to be at the centre of such battles. 
18 For a sweeping though provocative critique of so-called postcolonial cultural 
studies' failure to conceive of colonialism in plural and local terms see Thomas. 
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